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ABSTRACT 
The progression toward reevaluating patent validity in the 
administrative, rather than judicial, setting became overtly 
substitutionary in the America Invents Act. No longer content to 
encourage court litigants to rely on Patent Office expertise for faster, 
cheaper, and more accurate validity decisions, Congress in the AIA took 
steps to force a choice. The result is an emergent border between court 
and agency power in the U.S. patent system. By design, the border is not 
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absolute. Concurrent activity in both settings over the same dispute 
remains possible. What is troubling is the systematic weakening of this 
border by Patent Office encroachments on powers Congress left to the 
courts. This Article traces the statutory roots of those encroachments, 
their initial encouragement by the Supreme Court’s 2016 Cuozzo 
decision, and the recent resistance to their further expansion by the en 
banc Federal Circuit’s 2018 Wi-Fi One decision. Section I introduces the 
institutional history that underpins these developments. Section II 
summarizes the reallocation of ex post validity review power from the 
district courts to the Patent Office over the last third of a century, putting 
important attributes of Patent Office review into an administrative law 
context. Section III describes the particular powers being reallocated and 
discusses the importance of these powers to a well-functioning system for 
governing innovation as patent law seeks to do. Section IV reviews the 
recent en banc Federal Circuit decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom and 
discusses its implications for the patent powers at stake. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s renewed interest in patent law over the past 15 
years reveals a striking preoccupation with administrative power. Since 
Professor John Duffy in 2002 predicted “a return of the Supreme Court to 
the field of patent law,”1 the Court has decided an average of about three 
patent cases per year.2 Of these, five decisions and the two most recent 
grants of certiorari were cases concerned quite directly with 
administrative process.3 Another eight cases were about core 
requirements for patentability and were decided with the quality of the 
Patent Office administrative examination process in the mid-ground.4 
This brief history of modern Supreme Court patent jurisprudence is 
also a mixed one. Part of the Court’s administrative turn was a necessary 
reaction to the 2011 America Invents Act (AIA), which created a suite of 
new Patent Office proceedings to reevaluate the validity of issued 
patents.5 Various features of these controversial proceedings were 
litigated almost immediately, and the Court could not long have avoided 
resolving at least some institutional questions. Yet the Court itself was a 
1. John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 283 (2002). 
2. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION BLOG,
www.writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html [https://perma.cc/LVP5-XEJL]. 
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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significant mover toward administrative adjudication in patent law. Its 
1999 decision in Dickinson v. Zurko rejected the relatively undeferential 
review that the Patent Office long received in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit,6 which has virtually exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent-related cases.7 The Court in Zurko also confirmed 
that the Patent Office was subject to the Administrative Procedure Act, 
heralding a decline in the agency’s exceptional treatment amid the modern 
administrative state.8 
Since then, academic interest in the administrative process of patent 
law has grown considerably. Scholars have studied many contexts where 
administrative law appears to treat the patent system differently and 
concluded either that exceptionalism is inapt9 or that it is justified on the 
merits.10 The argument from historical practice alone is ever-diminishing. 
In one respect, this renewed engagement with patent law’s historical 
insulation from administrative law was necessary. Historically, allocation 
of power between the Patent Office and the courts was a relatively bright-
line matter. The agency had plenary power ex ante to examine inventions 
and issue or deny patents. Once a patent issued, the courts had virtually 
plenary power ex post to adjudicate infringement, give remedies, and 
revisit validity issues.11 As the power to reevaluate patent validity ex post 
increasingly moved to the Patent Office through legislation, the salience 
of administrative power in patent law grew as well, forming an 
unmistakable break from historical practice. To manage a break of this 
sort requires theory, not mere habit, and one may reasonably understand 
6. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 165 (1999). 
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1295(a)(4) (2012). 
8. Peter Lee, Supreme Assimilation in Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1433 (2016). 
9. See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 899 (2017)
(arguing that Patent Office technology classifications are informal adjudications of fact merit 
deference under the APA); Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron 
Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959 (2013) (arguing that Patent Office 
interpretations of core patentability requirement statutes merit Chevron deference); Kali Murray, First 
Things First: A Principled Approach to Patent Administrative Law, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 29 
(arguing, inter alia, that the Patent Office can—contrary to conventional wisdom in patent doctrine—
engage in substantive rulemaking and receive at least some judicial deference for the rules that result). 
10. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover, 65 DUKE 
L.J. 1657 (2016) (arguing that even the new AIA proceedings do not delegate interpretive authority 
to the Patent Office, making Chevron deference inappropriate); Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law 
in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127 (2000) (arguing that the patent system 
should, as a wholesale matter, resist assimilation into ordinary principles of administrative law 
because of conceptual and normative differences between patent law and the modern regulatory state). 
11. The Patent Office retained modest powers ex post to reissue patents and make certain other 
technical corrections, but full reevaluation of the merits of the patent grant traditionally took place in 
Article III courts. 
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the literature on patent exceptionalism as a foundation for broader debate 
about how power should be allocated among institutions in the patent 
system. 
By now, the Court’s stake in this broader debate is clear. In a trilogy 
of cases12 directed to the AIA proceedings conducted in the agency’s 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), the Court has taken up essential 
questions of administrative power, up to and including the 
constitutionality of post-grant administrative review. Moreover, the 
Court’s patent jurisprudence has vindicated not only Professor Duffy’s 
prediction of more frequent involvement in patent cases but also his 
suggestion that a key contribution of the Court would be to police the 
borders among the Patent Office, the U.S. district courts, and the Federal 
Circuit.13 The Court would do well at border-policing precisely because 
it is relatively “detached” from the operational detail of patent law, even 
in a time of generous certiorari.14 
This Article evaluates the borders of court and agency power in the 
patent system in light of the Supreme Court’s ongoing supervision as well 
as the structural choices of the Patent Office and lower courts. Section II 
summarizes the progressive reallocation of ex post validity review power 
from the district courts to the Patent Office over the last third of a century, 
putting important attributes of Patent Office review into an administrative 
law context. Section III describes the particular powers being reallocated 
and discusses the importance of these powers to a well-functioning system 
for governing innovation as patent law seeks to do. Section IV reviews 
the recent en banc Federal Circuit decision in Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom and 
discusses its implications for the patent powers at stake. 
II. RECEDING JUDICIAL POWER IN PATENT LAW
The story of power transfer from the courts to the Patent Office is a 
story about favoring certain values incrementally, but persistently, over 
time and favoring institutions that optimize them. The values themselves 
are familiar in adjudication: expertise, manageable cost, and broad access. 
Naturally, these values come at a cost, and the arc of the story also reflects 
competing accounts of the overall benefit. 
12. Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2239
(June 12, 2017) (No. 16-712); SAS Inst. Inc. v. Lee, cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2160 (May 22, 2017) 
(No. 16-969); Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
13. Duffy, The Festo Decision, supra note 1, at 302–03 (suggesting that “[a]rbitrating 
institutional claims to power” would be a task for which the Court is institutionally well suited). 
14. Id. 
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A. Administrative Alternatives to Litigation 
The power to adjudicate patent validity ex post was first transferred 
from the courts to the Patent Office in 1980 with the creation of ex parte 
reexamination.15 Until then, the validity of issued patents was reevaluated 
in courts, either as a defense in an infringement lawsuit16 or in an action 
for declaratory relief.17 Ex parte reexamination began with a petition to 
the Patent Office challenging the validity of one or more patent claims 
and explaining the grounds for the challenge.18 If the petition presented a 
“substantial new question of patentability,” then reexamination would 
proceed between the patent owner and an examiner in the same ex parte 
fashion as the initial examination of a patent application.19 The next 
transfer of power came in 1999 with inter partes reexamination, which 
kept both the ability of third parties to request review and the need for a 
substantial new question of patentability.20 It also added a party into the 
mix. Although each step in an inter partes reexamination began with an 
Office action by the examiner and a response by the patent owner—in a 
familiar ex parte colloquy—the third-party requester was now able to file 
comments addressing the examiner’s and patent owner’s arguments.21 
The principal motivations for these administrative mechanisms were 
the relative inexpertise of judges and juries in technical matters, the cost 
of litigation, and constrained access from Article III standing 
requirements.22 As an agency extensively populated with trained scientists 
and engineers and experienced in applying the rules of patent law to 
technical inventions, the Patent Office reflected a more expert forum.23 
With respect to cost, reexamination did offer a cheaper alternative. In 
2004–2005, the typical (median) cost of legal services for an ex parte 
proceeding was $7,500.24 For an inter partes proceeding inclusive of all 
15. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015. 
16. 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2012). 
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). See also Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. 
Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965). 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
19. Id. §§ 303(a), 305. 
20. Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501; 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 312(a)
(2010). 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 314(b)(2) (2010). 
22. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual
PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 51–55 (2016) (discussing 
motivations for administrative, rather than judicial, review of patent validity). 
23. See Vishnubhakat, The Field of Invention, supra note 9, at 903–04 (describing the
substantive expertise of patent examiners). 
24. AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 18 (2005). 
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patent owner responses, the cost was $40,000.25 By contrast, for the 
lowest-stakes category of litigation, where less than $1 million was at 
stake, the typical cost of legal services was higher by an order of 
magnitude; $350,000 through the end of discovery and $650,000 total.26 
Access to agency review was universal. Reexamination could be 
requested by “any person at any time,” including the patent owner, in ex 
parte27 as well as inter partes proceedings.28 Unsuccessful challengers 
who wished to appeal to the Federal Circuit still had to show Article III 
standing,29 but the agency’s door was quite open. Significantly, ex parte 
reexamination could also be initiated on the Director’s initiative.30 
Although rare, Director-initiated reexamination bypassed the need for a 
reexamination petition and could take place at any time during the term 
of the patent.31 
The adjudicatory virtues—expertise, reduced cost, and broad 
access—that these reexamination proceedings embody are even more 
pronounced and actively tailored in AIA patent validity reviews.32 Rather 
than patent examiner staff in the Central Reexamination Unit, AIA 
proceedings are conducted right from the start before panels of three 
administrative patent judges, lending even greater competence in patent 
law and expertise in technical subject matter.33 By investing authority in 
the agency’s PTAB to conduct full administrative trials, the AIA makes 
administrative adjudication a realistic choice not just for low-stakes 
disputes but also for patent litigation involving tens of millions of dollars. 
In comparison to those amounts in controversy, PTAB reviews often 
reflect even greater relative savings in cost. 
As to broad access, however, PTAB reviews under the AIA are more 
nuanced than reexamination. In all three types of AIA proceedings, the 
patent owner may not seek review.34 Those who have previously filed 
25. Id. at 23. 
26. Id. at 22. 
27. 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
28. Id. § 311 (1999). 
29. Consumer Watchdog v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
30. 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2018). 
31. USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 2239 (9th ed. 2015). 
32. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 58–64 (discussing the features of inter 
partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant review under the AIA). 
33. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant 
Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 347 (2016); Eric C. Cohen, A Primer on Inter Partes Review, 
Covered Business Method Review, and Post-Grant Review before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
24 FED. CIR. B.J. 1, 26 (2014); 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
34. The ability of patent owners to buttress the legal strength of their patents is the subject of
a fourth AIA proceeding, supplemental examination, whose purpose is limited to providing additional 
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civil actions challenging the patent in court cannot obtain inter partes 
review35 or post-grant review.36 Meanwhile, those who have been charged 
with infringing a patent can obtain inter partes review on that patent only 
within one year after being served with the complaint.37 Conversely, those 
who seek covered business method review must first have been charged 
with infringing the patent at issue—non-defendants need not apply.38 
These features of access point toward a more explicitly 
substitutionary purpose for PTAB validity reviews. The drafters of the ex 
parte reexamination statute showed a light touch with regard to 
supplanting the courts in patent disputes. For example, the legislative 
history indicated the desirability of reexamination but declined to impose 
mandatory stays of litigation pending reexamination.39 By the time of the 
AIA’s enactment, however, Congress was prepared to shape the border 
between courts and the Patent Office more actively through the use of 
time bars, bars against a prior civil action in certain cases, and 
requirements for a prior civil action in other cases as just discussed. 
Congress was also prepared to impose estoppel against future proceedings 
in both court40 and agency41 settings. 
B. Court-Agency Substitution Under the PTAB 
Recent detailed empirical research on usage of the PTAB, 
particularly inter partes review, shows that the intended substitution of 
agency review for traditional litigation is, indeed, how litigants actually 
use the system.42 Two principal modes of substitution predominate.43 One 
is the standard model, whereby a party charged with patent infringement 
in a U.S. district court action challenges the validity of the patent as a 
disclosures of information material to patentability and avoid later charges of inequitable conduct that 
might invalidate the patent. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 
12, 125 Stat. 284, 325-27 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257 (2012)). 
35. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012). 
36. Id. § 325(a). 
37. Id. § 315(b). 
38. America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B). 
39. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(I) (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463 (“The 
reexamination of issued patents could be conducted with a fraction of the time and cost of formal 
legal proceedings. . . . [S]tay provisions are unnecessary in that such power already resides with the 
court to prevent costly pretrial maneuvering which attempts to circumvent the reexamination 
procedure.”). 
40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2) (2012). 
41. Id. §§ 315(e)(1), 325(e)(1). 
42. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 49. 
43. Id. 
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defensive response.44 The other is the nonstandard model, where a party 
that has not been sued on a given patent, at least not yet, nevertheless 
brings a PTAB petition to challenge the patent.45 Both models are 
observed to a significant degree. Some 70% of those who challenge 
patents in inter partes review are standard petitioners, and 30% are 
nonstandard.46 
Nonstandard petitioners, moreover, represent an important strategic 
puzzle given their posture as preemptive strikers. Those who were 
imminently about to be sued in U.S. district court and simply happened to 
file first in the PTAB are rare (about 3%).47 Somewhat less rare, and more 
counterintuitive, are PTAB cases with no observed parallel litigation in 
the federal courts (about 13%).48 On first impression, especially in the 
case of inter partes review, these latter cases would seem simply to call 
undesired attention to the petitioner’s potentially infringing activity.49 
There are two partial explanations to this substitutionary puzzle as well as 
a larger, more strategic trend at work. 
One partial explanation is that the lack of observed parallel litigation 
is merely temporary and that patent owners whose rights are challenged 
will soon file responsive litigation. Such litigation would be stayed by 
statute, at least initially,50 but would at least reveal additional valuable 
information about the parties’ intentions. This explanation is not a 
complete account, however, as PTAB petitions without any counterpart 
litigation have been observed since the earliest days of AIA review.51 
A second partial explanation is that these cases may reflect a 
selection of disputes where petitioner arguments about patent invalidity 
are strong and patent owner arguments about infringement are weak.52 
This type of selection would require that both sides have adequate and 
symmetric ex ante information about the relative merits of each other’s 
arguments.53 This sort of clarity is more likely for chemical (drugs and 
medical) and potentially electrical and mechanical-related patents, as 
these fields benefit from standard technical nomenclature and offer more 
44. Id. at 73–74. 
45. Id. at 74. 
46. Id. at 73–74. 
47. Id. at 70 (discussing PTAB cases with a parallel litigation in the offing). 
48. Id. at 71 (discussing PTAB cases with no related litigation). 
49. Id. 
50. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2) (2012). 
51. Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 71 (“[I]t is still possible, but increasingly
unlikely, that a patent owner who has not asserted a patent against an IPR or CBM challenger will do 
so now.”). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 71–72. 
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easily discernible inventive boundaries.54 This is, indeed, what the data 
suggest.55 
The larger strategic dynamic, however, requires looking not only at 
nonstandard petitions or nonstandard petitioners in isolation but at both 
together. The very conception of the PTAB as a substitute for the federal 
courts contains within it an ambiguous choice about timing. Standard 
substitution is a choice of agency over court after the patent owner’s intent 
to sue has been realized, whereas nonstandard substitution is the same 
choice, but before (or instead of) going to court at all. The principal 
difference between these choices is information about litigation risk, and 
it stands to reason that coordinating with other, similarly situated actors 
in the same technology or market may produce this information. 
Combined data on petitions and petitioners reveals how powerful this 
coordination is in practice. 
Within certain technologies, there are significant disparities between 
the share of inter partes review petitioners who were previously sued on 
the patents that they now challenge and the share of inter partes review 
petitions where at least one petitioner was previously a defendant on the 
patent in question.56 For example, the disparity among drugs and medical-
related patents is 48.5% (petitioners) vs. 70.8% (petitions).57 Among 
mechanical-related patents, it is 53.1% vs. 70.2%.58 These disparities 
reveal that nonstandard petitioners, who are not prior defendants, are 
joining standard petitions, filed by parties who are prior defendants.59 
This pattern of strategic joinder appears to be a mix of socially beneficial 
collective action by patent validity challengers as well as undesirable 
harassment of patent owners through serial challenges in the PTAB.60 
Disentangling the two is now the subject of an extensive follow-on 
empirical effort.61 
In all, court-agency substitution in the wake of the AIA highlights a 
decisive shift in favor of the Patent Office as a guarantor of expertise, 
lower cost, and broader access. The observed evidence of this substitution 
shows that the court-agency border envisioned by the AIA’s statutory time 
54. Id. at 72. 
55. Id. (discussing technology-specific proportions among patents involved only in PTAB
review, those involved only in federal-court litigation, and those involved in both). 
56. Id. at 74. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 74–75. 
61. Jay P. Kesan, Saurabh Vishnubhakat & Alan C. Marco, Serial Petitioning at the PTAB:
Joinder, Denial, Precedent and Finality, in progress. 
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bars, prior civil action bars, and estoppel provisions has had a real and 
meaningful effect. Naturally, these adjudicatory virtues carry important 
costs as well. For example, a more widely accessible and affordable forum 
is also more susceptible to abuse by those with strategic or even nefarious 
purposes, such as using the threat of a PTAB challenge, with its ease of 
entry and lower burdens of proof, to extract nuisance settlements from a 
patent owner, to deliberately affect the stock price of the patent owner for 
profit, or both.62 An even more significant tradeoff is that the Patent 
Office, though an expert agency, is subject to considerable political 
influence that may distort its adjudicatory process whereas the Article III 
courts, though lacking technical expertise, are better protected from such 
political distortions. 
C. Unreviewable Agency Discretion 
The potential for political distortion in Patent Office adjudication is 
especially salient because of how Congress in the AIA delegated powers 
to review patent validity.63 The power actually to adjudicate the validity 
of patents that are selected for review was delegated directly to the 
PTAB.64 Meanwhile, the power to screen initial requests for review was 
delegated to the Director, the politically appointed head of the agency.65 
It is the Director who currently sub-delegates the screening power to the 
PTAB, allowing each three-judge panel both to screen a petition for merit 
and, if the case is selected, to conduct the actual review.66 Moreover, the 
AIA makes the Director’s screening determinations “final and 
nonappealable.”67 The actual adjudication of selected cases remains 
judicially reviewable,68 but a sphere of initial agency decision-making is 
beyond the reach of the Federal Circuit to oversee. 
There are two problems, then, with making screening decisions 
nonappealable. One is that threshold choices about what kinds of patents 
will be more or less aggressively targeted for scrutiny will be made in the 
62. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for Its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 284–85 (2015); Gregory Dolin, 
Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 933 (2015). 
63. The arguments in this section are laid out more fully in Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Disguised 
Patent Policymaking, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming). 
64. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 326(c) (2012) (providing expressly that the “Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board”—not the Director—shall conduct the administrative review proceedings). 
65. Id. §§ 314, 324 (providing expressly that the “Director” shall be the one to determine 
whether PTAB review is appropriate, and prescribing standards for the Director’s determinations). 
66. 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2018). 
67. 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2012). 
68. Id. §§ 319, 329. 
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politically inflected setting of the Patent Office, with no judicial check on 
the agency’s destabilizing treatment of patent property rights.69 This is a 
direct systemic cost of empowering the Patent Office out of a desire for 
the agency’s technical expertise. Still, whether this cost is likely to be 
outweighed by the benefit is ultimately a policy question, and it is one that 
Congress answered when crafting the AIA. 
The second, more troubling problem with the nonappealability of 
screening decisions is that it creates opportunities for the Patent Office to 
evade even the ordinary judicial review to which it would otherwise be 
subjected. Both requiring PTAB petitions to be screened for merit and 
immunizing the screening decisions from review rest on the same 
concern: conserving agency resources.70 Accordingly, the various criteria 
by which petitions are accepted for the various kinds of AIA reviews all 
require essentially the same thing: sufficient likelihood of success on the 
merits.71 For screening to look ahead to merits adjudication in this way, 
however, means that one may frame certain issues either as pertaining to 
screening (and so being nonappealable) or as pertaining to adjudication 
(and so being appealable). To evade judicial review, the Patent Office 
need only do the former consistently. 
It has done just that. As to whether petitions for inter partes review, 
including the legal grounds for challenge and supporting evidence, have 
been pled with the necessary “particularity,”72 the agency has argued that 
its initial evaluations are exercises of its screening power and so are 
immune from judicial review, even after a final agency decision has been 
69. See John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 518, 548 (2010) (arguing that the political exercise of power by the Patent Office over 
substantive patent rights would create a regime “too uncertain to foster the kinds of investments that 
patent property rights are intended to foster”). Importantly, Duffy’s argument about stability in 
property rights is altogether distinct from the broader claim, beyond the scope of this Article, that the 
government would be constitutionally constrained or forbidden from disrupting patent property rights. 
See, e.g., Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of 
Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689 (2007). 
70. This was carried forward from the earlier reexaminations and their requirements of a
“substantial new question of patentability,” see supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text, as a way 
to avoid merely rehashing issues that the original patent examiner already and adequately decided. 
See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation 
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 45–46 (1997). 
71. For inter partes review, this means a “reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.” 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012). 
For covered business method review and post-grant review, it must be “more likely than not that at 
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable.” Id. § 324(a). 
72. Id. § 312(a). 
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entered on the merits of the case.73 The soundness of legal argument and 
the quality of evidence underlying a decision can, of course, be properly 
understood as pertaining to adjudication, but the Supreme Court read the 
statutory text as supporting the agency’s position.74 This was the Cuozzo 
decision, the first in the Court’s PTAB trilogy.75 Since then, the Patent 
Office has persistently made the same argument in other contexts as 
well.76 These efforts have met with varying success, but following the 
favorable baseline set in Cuozzo, the agency exercises considerable 
latitude for the time being in its decisions over the validity of patents. 
The result is that judicial unreviewability of screening does more 
than exacerbate the costs of imposing a horizontal border between the 
district courts and the Patent Office as substitutes for each other. It also 
erects a second, vertical border between the Federal Circuit and the 
political leadership of the Patent Office as competing overseers. 
III. EMERGING COURT-AGENCY BORDERS
The foregoing account of administrative ascendancy in patent law 
implicates three significant powers. First is the power to adjudicate patent 
validity, and it is allocated across a horizontal border between the district 
courts and the Patent Office.77 Second is the power to oversee the 
administrative adjudication of patent validity, and it is allocated across a 
vertical border between the Patent Office leadership and the traditional 
supervision of the Federal Circuit.78 Third, and related to the second, is 
the power to interrogate the agency’s reasoning and the quality of its 
decision-making process. This last power is somewhat, but not solely, an 
aspect of the dichotomy between internal agency oversight and external 
judicial oversight. Even if the ordinary ambiguities regarding 
nonappealability are resolved in the agency’s favor, the Federal Circuit 
may still have a further, more fundamental role in ensuring the fidelity of 
the Patent Office to adjudicatory norms and the rule of law. 
73. See generally Brief for the Respondent in Opposition, Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee,
136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446). 
74. Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
75. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
76. Notable among these contexts are the statutory time bar for U.S. district court defendants
to come to the PTAB within one year of being sued, or forgo administrative altogether, as well as the 
agency’s obligations to issue final written decisions. See infra Section III.B (discussing relevant post-
Cuozzo cases). 
77. See supra Section II.B (discussing standard and nonstandard substitution). 
78. See supra Section II.C (discussing judicial unreviewability of agency screening). 
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A. Patent Powers at Stake 
The border between district courts and the agency in exercising the 
power to adjudicate patent validity means something more than just the 
differences in the intrinsic attributes of these forums. By their own terms, 
various provisions of the AIA that empower the Patent Office to 
adjudicate patent validity limit that adjudicatory power. Inter partes 
reviews are limited in scope and in the availability of evidence79 but far 
less limited in time, extending even to patents that were issued prior to the 
AIA.80 Covered business method review and post-grant review are much 
broader in scope and evidence,81 and while post-grant review is strictly 
limited in time and applies only to post-AIA patents,82 covered business 
method review also extends to pre-AIA patents.83 By contrast, ordinary 
judicial reevaluation of a patent’s validity carries no inherent limitations 
on the scope of review, the available evidence, or the types of patents that 
can be reevaluated, though the court may defer to the agency on certain 
burdens of proof or persuasion. 
Instead, the border consists of structural provisions that direct certain 
parties and disputes into one forum rather than the other through actual 
mandates or prohibitions. For example, review is barred in all three AIA 
proceedings where the party challenging the patent previously filed a civil 
action challenging the same patent.84 Inter partes review cannot be had if 
the party challenging the patent waited more than one year since being 
served with a district court complaint alleging infringement of the patent 
in question.85 That is, nonstandard petitioners can come at any time, but 
standard petitioners can wait no more than a year. By contrast, covered 
business method review can be had only if the party challenging the patent 
has previously been sued for infringing the patent.86 Only standard 
petitioners are allowed; nonstandard petitioners are barred altogether. And 
all three proceedings create various estoppel effects against future 
relitigation in the courts, or in the Patent Office itself, on grounds that 
were raised or reasonably could have been raised during the first 
proceeding.87 
79. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2012). 
80. Id. § 311(c). 
81. Id. § 321(b). 
82. Id. § 321(c). 
83. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(2), 125 Stat. 284, 330
(2011). 
84. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1) (2012). 
85. Id. § 315(b). 
86. America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(B). 
87. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e); America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)(A).
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Importantly, some of these structural border provisions are initially 
enforced in the agency, such as the prior civil action bars, the prior civil 
action requirement, and the one-year time bar. Others, such as the agency-
court estoppel provisions, can initially be enforced only in the court after 
an AIA proceeding has already taken place and the prior patent validity 
challenger tries to relitigate an issue in a later civil action. The proper 
enforcement of the latter is not particularly problematic, as it would be 
subject to ordinary appellate correction in the Federal Circuit,88 and the 
Federal Circuit’s own potential pathologies would be subject to Supreme 
Court correction.89 
However, those provisions that are initially enforced in the Patent 
Office may remain outside the reach of the Federal Circuit’s ability to 
correct. The potential for this agency indiscipline is especially stark in 
light of the nonappealability statutes that protect screening decisions 
about which patent validity challenges to accept for review and in light of 
Patent Office efforts to recast adjudication-related issues as screening-
related in order to resist judicial oversight.90 Indeed, one such border 
provision has already been the subject of these efforts: the one-year time 
bar for inter partes review. 
The problem with a lack of judicial supervision over the AIA’s court-
agency border provisions would not be that internal oversight by the 
agency’s political leadership is necessarily inferior at producing particular 
desired results. To the contrary, the Patent Office can be quite politically 
responsive, and stakeholder complaints about disfavored agency policies 
can lead to dramatic reversals.91 Rather, the problem would be that 
making even the underlying structure of patent validity review so directly 
beholden to shifting political winds undermines the central purpose of the 
AIA, which was to provide an improved alternative to court litigation for 
reevaluating patent property rights,92 not to replace it with industrial 
policy. 
The related potential effect of a Federal Circuit retreat from the 
AIA’s nonappealability provisions would be further, separate agency 
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
89. See Duffy, The Festo Decision, supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text. 
90. See supra Section II.C.
91. See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, USPTO Removes Rule Changes, PATENTLYO (Oct. 14, 2009),
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/10/uspto-removes-rule-changes.html [https://perma.cc/FU2B-
VA36] (discussing the withdrawal of a controversial rule change governing continuation practice, 
even though litigation was still pending, citing a preference for “other initiatives that would garner 
more of a consensus with the patent user community”). 
92. See Vishnubhakat, Rai & Kesan, supra note 22, at 49 (discussing the substitutionary
purpose of PTAB review). 
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indiscipline in explaining its decision-making. Even if all those court-
agency border provisions that are enforced initially in the Patent Office 
were overseen only internally by the agency’s own political leadership—
a state of affairs that would be far from proper—the PTAB’s otherwise 
unreviewable decisions would still be required to give adequate and 
coherent reasons and to rest on legitimate decision-making processes.93 
This, too, has been a source of controversy in recent Patent Office practice 
under the AIA. 
In a slew of screening decisions that now number in the hundreds, 
the PTAB has declined to hear otherwise meritorious challenges to patent 
validity on the grounds that they are “redundant” to other challenges that 
are contained in the same petition.94 When pressed to explain the nature 
of, and authority for, its redundancy-based logic, the Patent Office simply 
pointed to the AIA’s nonappealability provisions and claimed absolute 
discretion in exercising the screening power.95 The key request in the 
appeal—a petition for a writ of mandamus directing the PTAB to 
“reconsider its redundancy decision”—was denied.96 Nevertheless, Judge 
Reyna wrote separately to express his grave concern that the agency’s 
argument amounted to a “claim to unchecked discretionary authority” and 
was “unprecedented.”97 Still, the practice remains unchecked by any 
conclusive contrary Federal Circuit holding and is instead supervised at 
most by internal agency leadership. 
These three powers—adjudicating patent validity, overseeing agency 
adjudication of patents, and interrogating agency reasoning—are highly 
interrelated in how they span the border between the Patent Office and the 
courts: both the district courts that now compete with the agency and the 
Federal Circuit that actively supervised it before the AIA. The ways in 
which parties, patents, or disputes may still traverse from court to agency 
or vice-versa beyond what the AIA envisioned are still in flux, making the 
border porous for the present. But solidification appears to be on the 
horizon with cases that have followed Cuozzo in clarifying the procedural 
structure of the PTAB. 
93. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (2012). 
94. The discussion that follows is detailed and theorized more fully in Saurabh Vishnubhakat, 
The Non-Doctrine of Redundancy, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming). 
95. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys, Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1302–03 (Reyna, J., 
concurring). 
96. Id. at 1299, 1302 (majority opinion).
97. Id. at 1303 (Reyna, J., concurring). 
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B. Cuozzo and Its Progeny 
The Court’s conclusion in Cuozzo about the scope of 
nonappealability rested on two important premises. One was the proper 
characterization of the agency action itself. The other was the practical 
effect of the action. To the first point, the Court explained that evaluating 
whether the petition had been pled with particularity was quintessentially 
related to institution, the screening and selection of cases for PTAB 
review.98 These sorts of “mine-run” claims, the Court held, are part and 
parcel of the agency’s decision “under this section [§ 314]” whether to 
proceed, and accordingly they are nonappealable.99 From this, it followed 
that review may still be available for other statutes less-closely related to 
institution, i.e., for decisions that look less like screening and more like 
adjudication.100 To the second point, the Court explained further that 
review may also be available for “appeals that implicate constitutional 
questions” as well as for “questions of interpretation that reach, in terms 
of scope and impact, well beyond [§ 314].”101 
These self-imposed limitations on the logic and limits of Cuozzo 
have since manifested in two follow-on cases. One is SAS Institute v. 
Iancu, now pending before the Court102 and another part of the PTAB 
trilogy.103 The other is Wi-Fi One v. Broadcom Corp., just decided by the 
en banc Federal Circuit.104 
Though it is already before the Court and therefore has greater 
potential to extend or even alter the Cuozzo framework, SAS Institute is a 
somewhat easier case than Wi-Fi One, at least with respect to judicial 
unreviewability. The question in SAS Institute is whether the PTAB must 
issue a final written decision as to every patent claim that was challenged 
in a PTAB petition seeking review, or merely as to every patent claim on 
which the PTAB actually granted review.105 
Answering this question requires evaluating first the effect of 
requiring additional final written decisions about patent claims that are 
challenged but not accepted for review. Because these additional patent 
98. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016) (“[The particularity 
requirement] is an ordinary dispute about the application of certain relevant patent statutes concerning 
the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review.”). 
99. Id. at 2136, 2141. 
100.  Id. at 2141. 
101.  Id. 
102.  No. 16-969 (Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 31, 2017). 
103.  See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
104.  878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
105.  See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu (U.S. Jan. 31, 2017) (No. 16-
969). 
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claims were initially screened out, directing the agency to go back and 
address them anyway would, in the view of the Patent Office, violate the 
nonappealability statute.106 Under Cuozzo, however, the agency’s 
obligation to issue a complete, statutorily compliant final written decision 
is considerably “less closely related” to institution under § 314 than was 
the particularity requirement of § 312.107 Put another way, the agency’s 
final decision is unconcerned with screening and squarely concerned with 
adjudication. 
The “scope and impact” of the final written decision, too, extends 
well beyond the institution decision—indeed, beyond the agency itself. It 
is the issuance of a final written decision that triggers estoppel,108 a 
structural feature of the court-agency border that necessarily implicates 
subsequent court proceedings. Conversely, even if the agency’s 
obligations as to the final written decision were to be constrained by what 
arguments the PTAB initially rejected, that exercise of the screening 
power would, by the same token, have a scope and impact that were 
deeply felt throughout the proceeding as well as in estoppel effects upon 
subsequent proceedings. This, too, would counsel review under Cuozzo. 
The closer case, albeit not yet before the Court,109 is Wi-Fi One. The 
question in that case was whether the one-year time bar for inter partes 
review is subject to the nonappealability provision that governs PTAB 
decisions of whether to grant review.110 The position of the Patent Office 
remained that the time bar provision defines a category of cases for which 
review “may not be instituted”111 and is screening-related, just as the 
particularity requirement in Cuozzo was.112 
There are at least two notable problems with this reading.113 One is 
that it assumes the conclusion of relatedness under Cuozzo. That 
 106.  See Brief for the Federal Respondents in Opposition, SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu (U.S. Apr. 5, 
2017) (No. 16-969). 
107.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016). 
108.  35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e) (2012). 
109.  The en banc decision was handed down on January 4, 2018. 878 F.3d 1364. The deadline 
for certiorari, meanwhile, will run 90 days from the Federal Circuit’s entry of judgment. SUP. CT. R. 
13. 
 110.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 851 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (granting the petition 
for rehearing en banc and setting forth the en banc question). 
111.  35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2012). 
 112.  See En Banc Brief for Intervenor Michelle K. Lee, Director, United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Nos. 2015-1944, -1945, -1946, 2017 WL 
1132930, *9 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 1, 2017) (“Section 315(b) exemplifies the kind of institution-specific 
determination for which Congress intended to foreclose appeals.”). 
113.  The arguments first developed in this Article, then a working paper, were the basis for an 
en banc amicus curiae brief in Wi-Fi One. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of Patent and 
Administrative Law in Support of Neither Party, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., Nos. 2015-
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conclusion, however, must begin with what the statutory provision 
actually achieves and must then relate to institution “under this section [§ 
314].”114 For example, the reason why the particularity requirement at 
issue in Cuozzo was related to institution is that evaluating a petition’s 
requisite likelihood of success under § 314(a), one must consider the 
contents of the petition, and the particularity requirement was one of 
several statutory prescriptions for that content.115 
By contrast, applying the one-year time bar does not similarly 
contribute to the evaluation, under § 314(a), of whether a petition is likely 
to succeed on the merits. A petition may be virtually certain to result in 
the cancellation of all the challenged patent claims—and still be barred 
from going forward—if the party seeking review was sued on the same 
patent more than one year earlier. Thus, the relation of the one-year time 
bar to the actual screening decision is minimal. At most, one can say that 
they both take place during the same initial phase of PTAB review. 
Moreover, the one-year time bar is one of the procedural pillars on 
which rests the border that allocates power between the courts and the 
Patent Office. Just as the estoppel-triggering effect of a final written 
decision in SAS Institute bears out significant scope and impact, so also 
do the exclusionary effects of the one-year time bar. Allowing a patent to 
be challenged in the Patent Office more than one year after it was asserted 
against the would-be challenger is not a choice that can be contained 
within the agency. Its impacts necessarily reach well outside the agency 
and into the district courts, where it frustrates the ability of patent owners 
to find repose against new parallel disputes in the PTAB.116 It also 
frustrates the ability of courts themselves to manage resources effectively 
when, even after considerable judicial investment in a case, the Patent 
Office can still allow the defendant to start again as a PTAB petitioner.117 
The year-and-a-half since the Court decided Cuozzo was a significant 
transition period for the PTAB, especially because the outcome in that 
first case vindicated the expansive position that the Patent Office had 
staked out. Had the outcome been a finding of reviewability, for example, 
it is likely that the Patent Office’s subsequent campaign to conflate 
screening and adjudication in order to resist judicial review would have 
1944, -1945, -1946 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2017), www.ssrn.com/abstract=2923316 
[https://perma.cc/D5AR-9JGP] [hereinafter Professors’ Brief]. 
114.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
 115.  Id. at 2142 (“Cuozzo’s claim that Garmin’s petition was not pleaded ‘with particularity’ 
under § 312 is little more than a challenge to the Patent Office’s conclusion, under § 314(a), that the 
‘information presented in the petition’ warranted review.”). 
116.  Professors’ Brief, supra note 113, at 14. 
117.  Id. 
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been more muted or even have stopped. Instead, the court-agency border 
has become more porous, not less, through the agency’s arguments about 
its discretion, immunity from judicial review, and ability to self-supervise. 
Now at the end of this transition period, SAS Institute has some potential 
to elaborate the outer bounds of Cuozzo. The more revealing lesson and 
solidifying force, however, seems to be the Federal Circuit’s en banc 
opinion in Wi-Fi One, released early this year. 
IV. WI-FI ONE AND THE WAY FORWARD
In Wi-Fi One, the nine-judge en banc majority concluded that the 
one-year time bar for inter partes review is, indeed, subject to judicial 
review notwithstanding the nonappealability provision.118 The opinion 
offers clarifications about the practical reach of Cuozzo as well as 
indications of how effectively the court-agency border contemplated by 
the AIA is likely to serve its purposes in the future.119 
A. The En Banc Decision 
The focus of the opinion was primarily the balance of adjudicatory 
power between the district courts and the Patent Office. The majority 
recognized that by forbidding inter partes review where the petition 
comes more than one year after the petitioner has been served with a 
district court complaint for infringement, the time bar forces a 
substitutionary choice.120 That choice is to come to the agency within a 
year, or else not to come at all.121 In the court’s view, this border-enforcing 
function makes the time bar qualitatively—indeed, “fundamentally”—
different from requirements, such as particularity, that pertain to the 
contents of a petition.122 
In addition to the relatedness inquiry of Cuozzo, the en banc majority 
in Wi-Fi One briefly addressed two other issues. One was the “scope and 
impact” inquiry, which is also satisfied by the one-year time bar. The other 
118.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
 119.  The discussion that follows in this section was simplified and separately published as a 
blog post shortly after the en banc decision was issued. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, 
Time Bars, and Federal Circuit Oversight, PATENTLYO (Jan. 10, 2018), 
www.patentlyo.com/patent/2018/01/shenanigans-federal-oversight.html [https://perma.cc/3P35-
UZRF]. 
120.  See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1374 (“[The one-year time bar] governs the relation of IPRs to 
other proceedings or actions, including actions taken in district court.”). 
121.  Id. 
122.  Id. 
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issue was whether Cuozzo had changed the baseline for precluding 
judicial review. 
Because the Court in Cuozzo had held that routine determinations, 
“mine-run claims,” and the like were unreviewable, the exceptions that 
the Court took care to enumerate attracted considerable attention. Review 
could still be available, the Cuozzo majority reassured, for constitutional 
issues, for less closely institution-related statutes, for issues of broader 
scope and impact, and for plainly ultra vires agency actions.123 These so-
called “shenanigans” would not escape judicial scrutiny.124 Consequently, 
much of the debate surrounding Wi-Fi One was over whether the time bar, 
or anything else, was a shenanigan that could fit into one of these itemized 
exceptions. 
The en banc majority explained, however, that the inquiry did not 
begin with Cuozzo’s exceptions. Rather, the APA baseline is still the 
presumed availability of judicial review.125 The presumption was 
overcome in Cuozzo by the requisite “clear and convincing evidence.”126 
Broadcom, however, still had to overcome the presumption from scratch 
in the present case, and ultimately did not carry its burden.127 This 
jurisprudential point is a valuable reference marker in the en banc majority 
opinion, as it reiterated that the presumption of reviewability remains the 
default rule.128 
Meanwhile, the case also drew a four-judge dissent.129 In it, Judge 
Hughes read the nonappealability language of § 314(d) broadly, 
embracing all decisions whether to institute, not just decisions that turn 
on the petition’s reasonable likelihood of success.130 In support, the 
dissent drew a textual comparison to threshold determinations in 
reexamination, which were also nonappealable.131 In reexamination, 
however, what were shielded from judicial scrutiny were affirmative 
determinations to proceed but not negative determinations to withhold 
review.132 The text of inter partes review’s nonappealability, by contrast, 
123.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141–42 (2016). 
124.  Id. at 2142. 
125.  Id. at 2140. 
126.  Id.  
127.  Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1367. 
128.  Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power and the Limits of Cuozzo, 
PATENTLYO (May 5, 2017), www.patentlyo.com/patent/2017/05/agency-allocations-limits.html 
[https://perma.cc/D8NC-BAYQ].  
129.  Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1377 (Hughes, J., dissenting). 
130.  Id. at 1379. 
131.  Id. at 1380–81. 
132.  Id. 
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shields all determinations whether positive or negative.133 This textual 
difference, the dissent said, meant that the unreviewability of an AIA 
screening decision did not depend on its outcome and so should not 
depend on its origins, either.134 Whether based on likelihood of success, 
timeliness, or any other input, decisions about institution should be 
beyond judicial reach.135 
The dissent also raised an interesting argument, counseling against 
judicial review, based on a colloquy in Cuozzo itself between Justice 
Breyer’s opinion for the majority and Justice Alito’s dissent.136 The 
dissent had complained of how broadly the majority had swept in finding 
unreviewability, arguing specifically as an example that the majority’s 
reasoning would prohibit judicial review of the one-year time bar as 
well.137 The reason for this, according to Justice Alito, was that “the 
petition’s timeliness, no less than the particularity of its allegations, is 
closely tied to the application and interpretation of statutes related to the 
Patent Office’s decision to initiate . . . review.”138 The Cuozzo majority, 
meanwhile, pushed back against the dissent’s other negative predictions 
but remained silent about timeliness.139 By the time of Wi-Fi One, this 
colloquy from Cuozzo suggested a potential consensus on the Court that 
the one-year time bar was, like the particularity requirement, also 
judicially unreviewable.140 
One rejoinder to this argument is that Justice Alito’s comparison to 
the one-year time bar was a rhetorical position aimed at building a 
majority and, once it was clear that he would be in dissent, aimed at 
limiting the impact of the majority’s reasoning.141 The Cuozzo majority, 
after all, took pains to enumerate the many issues that it did not decide.142 
To infer from the majority’s silence a consensus about an even more 
nuanced issue would be simply implausible. 
Notably, the dissent did not address the “scope and impact” inquiry 
with respect to the one-year time bar.143 Functional considerations about 
interbranch respect for the relation between the Patent Office and the 
133.  Id. at 1381. 
134.  Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, supra note 119. 
135.  Id. 
136.  See Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power, supra note 128. 
137.  Id. 
138.  Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2155 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
139.  Id. at 2141–42 (majority opinion). 
140.  Judge Chen raised this point explicitly during the Federal Circuit’s en banc oral argument. 
Vishnubhakat, Court-Agency Allocations of Power, supra note 128. 
141.  Id. 
142.  Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42. 
143.  Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, supra note 119. 
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courts, which were salient to both Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in 
Cuozzo and Judge Reyna’s en banc majority opinion in Wi-Fi One, were 
absent from Judge Hughes’s dissent.144 
B. Patent Power Effects 
The Wi-Fi One decision represents a specific and informative 
Federal Circuit understanding of nonappealability in PTAB review. Being 
“closely related”145 to institution for Cuozzo purposes will generally be 
satisfied by showing logical relation between the statute in question and 
the “reasonable likelihood” standard for screening petitions under § 
314(a).146 A reasonable likelihood, in turn, is “clearly about whether the 
claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted.”147 Those statutory 
requirements that bear on anticipating the substantive outcome will more 
likely be found “closely related,” and vice-versa.148 
This approach suggests two important implications for the emergent 
border between the courts and the Patent Office. The first pertains to 
judicial review over other structural provisions that make up the court-
agency border after the AIA. The second pertains to potential next steps 
for a growing body of case decisions that offer compelling guidance on 
these issues. 
The analytical framework of Cuozzo and the elaboration from Wi-Fi 
One, taken together, generally counsel in favor of judicial review over the 
other structural provisions that primarily make up the post-AIA border 
between the courts and the Patent Office. For example, the bars on prior 
civil actions by the alleged infringer in inter partes review149 and post-
grant review150 are both likely to be reviewable. Both provisions are 
unrelated to the screening of cases under § 314(a) because neither pertains 
to whether a patent is likely to be found unpatentable in the present PTAB 
challenge. Instead, these statutory bars pertain to litigation activity by the 
would-be petitioner. 
Likewise, the requirement in covered business method review of a 
prior offensive civil action by the patent owner against the petitioner151 is 
144.  Id. 
145.  Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141. 
146.  Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (en banc). 
147.  Id. (citing Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2140) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148.  Id. 
149.  35 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012). 
150.  Id. § 325(a). 
151.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 284, 330 
(2011). 
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likely to be judicially reviewable. This provision, too, is unrelated to 
whether a patent is likely to be found unpatentable. Both sets of statutory 
provisions, like the one-year time bar, pertain to the litigation activity of 
parties (i.e., attributes extrinsic to the substance of the petition and the 
validity of the patent). 
This is even more true for the provisions that govern agency-agency 
estoppel and agency-court estoppel.152 Far from being related to the 
likelihood that a challenged patent will be found partly or fully invalid, 
these provisions are not even triggered until after a final written decision 
has been entered on the case at hand. They are entirely forward-looking 
and are also both likely to be reviewable under Cuozzo and Wi-Fi One. 
As for next steps, it is certainly possible that Broadcom will seek 
review in the Supreme Court.153 However, given the decision in Cuozzo 
itself and the pending controversy in SAS Institute, granting certiorari in 
Wi-Fi One would bring the Court for a third time into the specific issue of 
nonappealability and Federal Circuit oversight.154 Although the en banc 
dissent presents a plausible line of argument in support of certiorari, either 
outcome in SAS Institute may render moot the need for more clarification. 
Having reached a decision of unreviewability in Cuozzo, a decision in SAS 
Institute for judicial review would leave Wi-Fi One an unnecessary third 
case. This would especially hold true if the Court saw SAS Institute as a 
closer case than Wi-Fi One, as the facts of the latter case would do little 
to clarify the line between review and no review. 
By contrast, if SAS Institute came out the other way, in favor of 
unreviewability, then the result would be two Supreme Court holdings 
that denied review and one en banc Federal Circuit holding that granted 
it. The Court could also reasonably regard this as sufficient guidance on 
the question of Federal Circuit oversight in cases of PTAB validity 
review. The result would be the same: a denial of certiorari in Wi-Fi One. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Wi-Fi One decision reflects a welcome recognition by the 
Federal Circuit of the vital procedural structure that stands between the 
federal courts and the Patent Office. This court-agency border is a bulwark 
against the capacious view that the agency has taken of its own discretion 
and immunity from judicial oversight in conducting patent validity 
reviews under the AIA. Moreover, this border represents the intention of 
152.  35 U.S.C. §§ 315(e), 325(e). 
153.  See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
154.  Vishnubhakat, Shenanigans, supra note 119. 
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Congress to allocate power differently between the courts and the Patent 
Office, but not to divest either institution completely. 
Understood in this way, even a porous court-agency border remains 
a valuable antidote to a perceived mandate for the agency to govern itself 
unaccountable to any judicial power. The tendency of the Patent Office as 
an administrative agency to push the limits of its jurisdiction and to 
aggrandize itself, even in service of sincerely held policy goals, is 
understandable, perhaps even commonplace in the modern administrative 
state.155 Nevertheless, unlike agencies that routinely exercise this sort of 
power, the ability to make substantive legal pronouncements is still new 
in the patent system’s experience, and the window for reform has not 
passed. 
 155.  See, e.g., Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, 
Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1503–07 (2009); Perez v. 
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1210 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
24
Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/3
